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Abstract  
This study is part of a larger effort to better understand online behaviour. We tested the 
effect on people’s security behaviour of different ways of warning them about 
cybersecurity threats with an online experiment (n=5,065) in Germany, Sweden, Poland, 
the UK and Spain. Participants had to make a purchase in a mock online store, and their 
behaviour was observed through four behavioural measures. Results show that making 
users aware of the steps they can take to minimise their exposure to risk is effective in 
generating more secure behaviour, as suggested by protection motivation theory. Gain 
and loss-framed messages, and a message with a male anthropomorphic character, also 
had some effect on behaviour compared to the control group. The study also included a 
questionnaire. Results showed that more risk-averse participants exhibited more 
cautious behaviour. Finally, although they influenced behaviour itself, warning messages 
based on behavioural insights did not affect participants' self-reported knowledge of how 
to prevent cyberattacks.  
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Executive summary 
This study is part of a larger effort to better understand online behaviour. It follows a 
recent trend where empirical findings about human behaviour are increasingly taken into 
consideration by policy-makers worldwide.  
It tested the effect on people’s security behaviour of different ways of warning them 
about cybersecurity threats. In the language of behavioural economics, it explored the 
role of changes to the choice architecture, or nudges, on online decision-making. By 
demonstrating their efectiveness, it makes a case for their consideration as an additional 
policy tool. 
An online experiment (n=5,065) was conducted across five EU Member States: 
Germany, Sweden, Poland, the UK and Spain. Participants had to make a purchase in a 
mock online store, and their behaviour was observed through four behavioural 
measures: whether they connected to a server safely, whether they bought the product 
through a 'trusted vendor', whether they used secure passwords, and whether they 
remembered to log out. 
The nudges were in the form of warning messages, which reminded consumers to 
navigate safely and appeared at the beginning of the shopping exercise. These messages 
were altered slightly, according to different behavioural insights. 
Results show that making users aware of the steps they can take to minimise their 
exposure to risk is effective in generating more secure behaviour, as posited by 
protection motivation theory (PMT). These results challenge claims that users don't care 
or are somehow dismissive of the risks of cybersecurity. A more plausible explanation is 
that they are simply not aware of what they need to do. Warning messages should seek 
to directly remedy this. 
The report also presents a number of other findings. Gain and loss-framed messages had 
an effect on behaviour compared to the control group, but the magnitude of the loss-
framed was no greater than that of the gain-framed message. A male anthropomorphic 
character had an effect, but a female character did not. Finally, there was no difference 
between presenting a risk as having a small probability but a large impact or, 
conversely, as having a large probability but a small impact.  
Of the various behavioural measures used, the choice of selecting a trusted vendor (for a 
fee) vs choosing an untrusted but free vendor is the one that had the greatest 
variability, across treatments and across countries. This behaviour, therefore, emerged 
as the one most likely to be affected by nudges. Policies to improve security could 
consider this behaviour as a starting point when piloting their initiatives. 
The study, taking advantage of its large sample size, also included a number of 
questionnaire items. Their analysis revealed that more risk-averse participants will 
exhibit more cautious behaviour on a number of measures and that, on the whole, 
nudges did not affect their knowledge of how to prevent cyberattacks. Instead, nudges 
seem to work better on automatic rather than thought-out behaviour. The exception to 
this was knowledge of the benefits of logging out, which was affected by two PMT-
inspired conditions. 
One of the strengths of this report is the use of actual, observed online behaviour. Many 
studies have used either intention as the output variable or self-reported accounts of 
behaviour, both of which have limitations. 
These results are useful for policy-makers interested in warning users about potential 
cybersecurity risks. Warning messages based on behavioural insights might not increase 
consumers' knowledge, but they can help improve their browsing experience and build 
online trust.  
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1 Introduction  
While digital technology has enabled innovation, greater connectedness, economic 
growth and productivity, it has also given rise to a new threat: cybercrime. Users are 
aware of this threat and can shy away from certain activities over the Internet 
(especially those that involve the disclosure of personal information or economic 
transactions). In Europe, users still worry about the lack of security in online payments 
which prevent them from using the Internet for e-commerce (27% of respondents, 
according to a recent survey). They also have concerns about returning goods or making 
complaints (19%), and some still claim they lack the necessary skills to make 
transactions online (13%; EC, 2016) 1 . This means that the full potential of digital 
technology to empower consumers and drive economic growth remains unrealised.  
Reinforcing trust and security in the online environment, therefore, has become a 
political priority. In Europe, the European Commission has stressed the need to make 
the European digital economy more trusted and secure, so that citizens and businesses 
can fully reap its benefits. This objective is recognised in the Digital Single Market 
strategy
2
 (a top priority for President Jean-Claude Juncker), and by the Digital Agenda 
for Europe (DAE), the European Union flagship initiative on all ICT-related activities. 
Increased trust must go hand-in-hand with increased security. If trust increases in an 
insecure environment, more people will disclose sensitive information and be vulnerable 
to cyberattacks. A balance needs to be struck.  
Researchers and security experts are increasingly aware that security provided by 
stronger digital barriers has limits. No matter how perfect your security system is, it will 
always depend on people’s behaviour (e.g. not clicking on malicious links and keeping 
secure passwords). Human error is still one of the weakest links in the cybersecurity 
chain, and is responsible for nearly one-quarter of all cybersecurity failures (Waldrop, 
2016). 
People make mistakes because they are human, because they do not have sufficient 
information, because their online behaviour can become habitual (leading them to pay 
less attention and attribute less importance to the decision making process), or because 
they perceive the risks as low. Whatever the case, no matter how secure the technology, 
or how strong the legal system for persecuting cybercrime, cybercrime will continue to 
exist unless people navigate safely. And as long as cybercrime exists, people will not 
fully trust the online environment.  
Making people aware of the risks involved and getting them to behave safely online, 
however, is no easy task. Traditionally, users have been informed through warning 
messages, intended to increase their awareness and reassure them about the risks 
involved. However, this approach assumes people are rational and well-informed, which 
they are not. To be effective, policy initiatives should not rely on users making very 
informed or rational decisions (Acquisti, Brandimarte & Lowenstein, 2015). Greater 
insights into how people behave online are required. 
Hackers seem to have advanced knowledge on this. They send phishing emails from a 
sender that seems authoritative, at a time of the day when we are busy, increasing the 
chances that we will click where we should not. The institutions meant to defend users, 
on the other hand, are lagging behind. The excessive requests for authentication in an 
organisation (23 per day on average, according to a study by Stevens, 2014), drain 
people's time and mental energy. And recent evidence suggests that the guidelines for 
proper password management are misguided (Waldrop, 2016). 
                                           
1  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/europes-digital-progress-report-2016  
2  http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/  
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But while the focus has traditionally been on cybersecurity, from the perspective of 
computer science and not psychology, the tide seems to be turning. Recently President 
Obama proposed spending more than $19 billion on federal cybersecurity funding, 
including a research and development plan that makes human-factors research an 
explicit priority. There is a similar trend in the UK, which focuses on, for example, how 
criminals organise their business and how to help users with their passwords (Waldrop, 
2016). 
This report follows that trend. It is part of a larger initiative which explores the 
contribution of behavioural insights to cybersecurity. The aim is to observe whether 
changes in the design of web interfaces (i.e. the choice architecture according to the 
behavioural economics literature) lead to changes in online behaviour, and so merit 
attention as a policy tool. This approach builds on the premise that nudges, which are 
changes in the choice architecture to elicit certain behaviours, have been shown to be 
effective in other domains.  
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2 The insights behind the nudges 
This study is based on an online experiment (n = 5,065) across five European countries: 
Germany, Sweden, Poland, Spain and the UK.  We randomly assigned individuals to a 
control group or one of nine treatment groups, and then let them make a purchase in a 
mock e-commerce exercise. The nudges applied were subtle, and were embedded in a 
warning message reminding them to navigate safely. The way in which this message 
was framed and how it directed participants' attention differed across treatment groups.  
These nudges came from the relevant literature or from previous empirical work 
conducted in this field by the authors.  
2.1 Protection motivation theory 
One set of nudges was based on insights from protection motivation theory (PMT; 
Rogers, 1975, 1983), which seeks to clarify our concepts on the cognitive processes 
which mediate behaviour in the face of a threat. It posits that, when facing a threatening 
event, people conduct two appraisal processes: one focused on the threat itself and the 
other on the options they have to diminish it (threat appraisal and coping appraisal, 
respectively). This will affect their intention to take precautionary action and will result in 
adaptive or maladaptive behaviours vis-à-vis the threat. 
In their threat appraisal, people will consider how negative the consequences of the 
threat are (perceived severity) and the likelihood of the threat materialising (perceived 
vulnerability). In their coping appraisal, people will assess whether undertaking a 
recommended course of action will remove the threat (response efficacy) and their level 
of confidence in being able to carry it out (self-efficacy) (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Boer & 
Seydel, 1996). 
PMT has been applied to online safety protection, specifically to virus protection 
behaviour (Lee, LaRose and Rifon, 2008), security behaviour among people who know 
how to protect their systems but fail to do so (Workman, Bommer & Straub, 2008), 
security behavioural intentions of home computer users (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010), 
convincing Internet users to protect themselves (Shillair et al, 2015), teenagers' 
willingness to provide information online (Youn, 2005), security behaviour in response to 
fear appeals by employers (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010), and employees' adherence to 
information security policies (Siponen, Mahmood & Pahnila, 2014).  
Research in information systems has mainly used intention to behave as the main 
dependent variable when using PMT. This is probably because the initial formulation of 
PMT in social psychology used intention to behave. But of course there is a gap between 
intention and behaviour, and this is a limitation of the studies that have used PMT to 
explain security behaviour intention (Johnston and Warkentin, 2010, Liang & Xue 2010; 
Lee, 2011; Herath & Rao, 2009; Crossler, Long, Loraas & Trinkle, 2014).  
Some studies have used behaviour as the dependent variable (Neuwirth, Dunwoody & 
Griffin, 2000; Woon et al, 2005; Workman et al. 2008). Quite clearly, behaviour works 
better than intention, as an outcome variable. Behaviour is more interesting, as 
protection of information resources does not happen when individuals intend to behave, 
but rather when they actually do so (Crossler et al. 2013). However, even in cases 
where behaviour is the dependent variable, self-reported behaviour is used (Crossler, 
2014). This study, by contrast, relied on actual, observed behaviour. This feature 
constitutes one of its strengths and a distinct contribution to the field. 
Three PMT-inspired warnings were tested:  
 Coping appraisal message: facilitated individuals' coping appraisal by telling them it 
was easy to minimise the chances of a cyberattack and by indicating what steps they 
could take.  
 Threat appraisal message: sought to heighten the individual's perception of the 
threat by telling individuals they could be subject to a virus attack.  
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 Coping and threat appraisal message: combined both elements described above into 
one warning message.  
The threat appraisal message highlighted both the severity of the threat and the user’s 
vulnerability at the same time, since prior research (outside security behaviour) 
suggests they jointly determine the likelihood of individuals performing adaptive 
behaviours (Neuwirth, Dunwoody & Griffin, 2000). We considered that the cost of 
breaking the message down into these two components, in terms of an additional 
experimental treatment, would outweigh the value of having information for both 
elements separately. Moreover, it would run the risk of giving too weak a warning to 
have any impact at all. 
The following hypotheses guided the application of these insights to the study: 
Hypothesis 1. The group exposed to the coping appraisal message will show more 
secure online behaviour than the control group. 
Hypothesis 2.  The group exposed to the threat appraisal message will show more 
secure online behaviour than the control group. 
Hypothesis 3.  The group exposed to the threat and coping appraisal message will 
show more secure online behaviour than the control group. 
Hypothesis 4.  The group exposed to the threat and coping appraisal message will 
show more secure online behaviour than the coping appraisal message group. 
Hypothesis 5.  The group exposed to the threat and coping appraisal message will 
show more secure online behaviour than the threat appraisal message group. 
2.2 Gain vs. loss framing 
One of the main contributions of behavioural economics has been to show that the way 
in which information is presented, i.e. the framing of a message, can have an effect on 
behaviour. This is contrary to conventional economic thinking, which does not consider 
these changes to be significant. The rational consumer is expected to see through the 
fog and arrive at the relevant kernels of information. 
One of the main ways that framing has an effect is by presenting situations in terms of 
gain or losses. According to principles such as loss aversion and the endowment effect, 
the pain of losing something is greater than the joy of getting it (Kahneman, 2011).  
Messages which highlight potential losses should therefore be more effective than those 
highlighting potential gains. 
The following hypothesis guided the application of this insight to the study: 
Hypothesis 6. The group exposed to the loss-framed condition will show more 
secure online behaviour than the control group. 
Hypothesis 7. The group exposed to the gain-framed condition will show more 
secure online behaviour than the control group.  
Hypothesis 8. The group exposed to the loss-framed condition will show more 
secure online behaviour than the group exposed to the gain-framed condition.  
2.3 Anthropomorphic characters 
Human-like characters are increasingly used in eCommerce. They increase trust and 
perception of enjoyment, especially when they look like traditional salespersons offering 
a helping hand (Qiu & Benbasat, 2009). However, their effects on behaviour are less 
clear. Some researchers argue that an anthropomorphic character makes people feel 
observed, which leads them to be more careful in their disclosure of personal information 
(Groom & Calo, 2011; Moon, 200). Others argue that since they are unwittingly treated 
as trustworthy counterparts, they invite people to disclose greater amounts of personal 
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information (Bente, Dratsch, Relibach, Reyl & Lushaj, 2014; Heckman & Wobbrock, 
2000).  
Previous empirical findings on nudges to security behaviour show that a male 
anthropomorphic character increases security behaviour. However, there is no such 
effect for a female character (Rodriguez-Priego & van Bavel, 2016). In order to follow-up 
these findings and investigate further the effect of anthropomorphic characters, we 
posited the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 9.  The group exposed to the female anthropomorphic condition will 
show more secure online behaviour than the group exposed to control condition.  
Hypothesis 10.  The group exposed to the male anthropomorphic condition will 
show more secure online behaviour than the group exposed to control condition.  
2.4 Low-risk, high-impact vs high-risk, low-impact 
Another insight from behavioural economics is that people will take risks when dealing 
with potential losses, but will avoid them when dealing with potential gains. For 
example, people prefer a 50% chance of losing 1000 euros to a certain loss of 500 
euros, but they will prefer a certain gain of 500 euros over a 50% chance of winning 
1000 euros (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This insight is based on loss aversion: people 
are willing to take a risk in order to avoid the pain of losing. But it is not captured in the 
loss vs. gain-framed conditions. 
The loss vs. gain-framed conditions sought to test whether the mere framing of the 
impact of an attack as a gain or as a loss would lead to a change in behaviour. These 
conditions, on the other hand, sought to explore whether the prospect of having an 
almost-certain, albeit small, loss caused more dread (and therefore led to more secure 
behaviour) than an uncertain, albeit large, loss. 
Security behaviour can be characterised as being low-risk, but with a potentially 
devastating effect if a breach occurs. In this scenario, people take risks. However, if the 
risk were higher, but the impact less severe, people would behave more securely, 
following prospect theory. Faced with choosing between low-risk, high-impact vs. high-
risk, low-impact (ceteris paribus), people should prefer the former. The latter situation 
would be less preferable and would therefore make people more careful in their online 
behaviour.  
In the experiment, this insight translated into two conditions, both of which made 
reference to participants' variable fee.  As described below, this fee varied depending on 
how securely participants navigated. One condition (low-risk, high-impact) said that 1 in 
10 people who did not navigate safely in the website would lose 90% of their variable 
fee. The other (high-risk, low-impact) said that 9 out of 10 people who did not navigate 
safely would lose 10% of their variable fee. Since people want to avoid certain losses, 
the latter condition should display more secure behaviour than the former. 
Since these conditions talked about a 1-in-10 chance of losing 90% of their points or a 
9-in-10 chance of losing 10%, a comparison with the control condition (which gave no 
numbers of this kind) was not appropriate. They were only comparable with each other.   
Hypothesis 11.  The group exposed to the high–risk, low-impact condition will 
show more secure online behaviour than the group exposed to the low risk, high-
impact condition.  
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3 Methodology 
Data was collected by the Laboratory for Research in Behavioural Experimental 
Economics (LINEEX), Centre for Research in Social and Economic Behaviour (ERI-CES), 
University of Valencia using panel data (i.e. subject pools). The sample consisted of 
5,065 participants (50.56% females3) from five countries, representing different broad 
cultural areas of the EU: Sweden, Poland, Germany, Spain and the UK. Data on the 
profile of the population using the internet was taken from Eurostat. The sample was 
distributed evenly across countries (around 1,000 per country). 
The Ethics Committee on Experimental Behavioural Economics at ERI-CES approved this 
experiment and confirmed that it adhered to its charter of ethics. The experiment was 
carried out between October and December 2015. The study tested a total of ten 
security messages based on the insights described in the previous section, and targeted 
around 100 subjects per experimental treatment, balanced according to age and gender. 
Figure 1: Division of sample across countries and treatments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Experimental conditions 
In the purchasing process, participants were asked to buy a real product (desktop 
wallpaper). While doing so, they had to make several decisions that affected their 
security. The ten security messages appeared as pop-ups in the centre of the screen 
before the purchasing process began. Participants had to close the pop-up window to 
continue with the experiment. The message was then placed in the upper part of the 
screen and remained there throughout.   
In the control condition for this experiment, the pop-up message simply reminded the 
participant to navigate safely. There was the option of having a control condition with no 
security message at all (rather than a simple security message). However, a control 
condition of this kind would have limited the value of a potential result in any of the 
experimental treatments. In particular, it would not have been possible to determine 
                                           
3
  Further information on socio-demographics can be found in Table 1. 
Sweden 
1,019 participants 
Total 
5,065 participants 
Poland 
1,019 participants 
UK 
1,009 participants 
Spain 
1,004 participants 
Germany 
1,014 participants 
9 treatments + 
control 
Approx. 100 per 
group 
9 treatments + 
control 
Approx. 100 per 
group 
9 treatments + 
control 
Approx. 100 per 
group 
9 treatments + 
control 
Approx. 100 per 
group 
9 treatments + 
control 
Approx. 100 per 
group 
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whether the effect of a treatment was due to the nature of the message itself (and 
hence the importance of the behavioural insights that fed into its design) or due to the 
fact that one condition had a message and the other had none at all. Warning messages 
on their own, irrespective of their design, are presumed to have an impact on behaviour.  
The experimental conditions were: 
1. Heightened coping appraisal: this condition was based on protection motivation 
theory (PMT), and sought to heighten self-efficacy and response efficacy, both 
components of "coping appraisals". The security message told participants they 
had the ability to easily make decisions on how safely they navigated, and gave 
indications on how they could protect themselves. 
2. Heightened threat appraisal: this condition was also based on PMT. It sought to 
heighten participants' perception of the cybersecurity threat. The security 
message warned that if they did not navigate safely, their personal data could be 
compromised or a virus could be introduced onto their computers. 
3. Combined coping + threat appraisal: this condition included both elements of the 
coping appraisal and threat appraisal messages. The aim was to test whether 
providing both types of appraisals would increase the effectiveness of the security 
message. 
4. Gain-framed warning message: this condition added a gain-framed message to 
the reminder to navigate safely. It highlighted how much variable income 
participants could win if they navigated safely.  
5. Loss-framed warning message: this condition added a loss-framed message to 
the reminder to navigate safely. It highlighted how much variable income 
participants could lose if they failed to navigate safely. 
6. Female anthropomorphic character: this condition presented the same reminder 
to navigate safely as the control condition, but added a female anthropomorphic 
character inside the pop-up message.  
7. Male anthropomorphic character: this condition presented the same reminder to 
navigate safely as the control condition, but added a male anthropomorphic 
character inside the pop-up message. 
8. Low-risk, high-impact condition: in addition to the reminder to navigate safely 
(same as in the control condition), this condition stated that 1 in 10 people who 
did not navigate safely in this website would suffer a cyberattack and lose 90% of 
their variable incentive.  
9. High–risk, low-impact condition: this was the counterpart to the low-risk, high-
impact condition. It stated, in addition to the reminder to navigate safely, that 9 
in 10 people who did not navigate safely in this website would suffer a 
cyberattack and lose 10% of their variable incentive.  
 
Conditions 9 and 10 were only comparable with each other, and not with the control 
condition. They differed from the control condition on two counts. Not only were their 
security messages different in form, but they were also different in substance. They 
mentioned specific probabilities, whereas the control condition (and other experimental 
conditions, for that matter) did not.  
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Figure 2: Ten security messages 
Control  
Navigate safely. 
Heightened coping appraisal 
Navigate safely. 
You can easily minimise the possibility of suffering a cyberattack if you choose 
secure connections, remember to log out and use secure passwords (e.g. 
combining lower and upper cases, numbers and symbols). 
Heightened threat appraisal 
Navigate safely. 
If you don’t, your personal data could be compromised or you could introduce 
a virus onto your computer. 
Combined coping + threat appraisal 
Navigate safely. 
You can easily minimise the possibility of suffering a cyberattack if you 
choose secure connections, remember to log out and use secure passwords 
(e.g. combining lower and upper cases, numbers and symbols). 
If you don’t, your personal data could be compromised or you could introduce 
a virus onto your computer. 
Gain-framed warning message 
Navigate safely. 
If you do, you could win the maximum final endowment. 
Loss-framed warning message 
Navigate safely. 
If you don't, you could lose part of the final endowment. 
Female anthropomorphic character 
 Navigate safely. 
Male anthropomorphic character 
 Navigate safely. 
Low-risk, high-impact  
Navigate safely. 
1 in 10 people who don't navigate safely in this website will suffer a 
cyberattack and lose 90% of the points on their credit card. 
High-risk, low-impact  
Navigate safely.  
9 in 10 people who don't navigate safely in this website will suffer a 
cyberattack and lose 10% of the points on their credit card. 
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3.2 Behavioural measures 
The experiment measured four behavioural outcomes that are considered necessary for 
users to maintain cybersecurity (Coventry, Briggs, Jeske & van Moorsel, 2014). Although 
the list of such behaviours is longer, the experiment focussed on those related to online 
purchasing processes which could be feasibly tested in an experiment. These are: 
3.2.1 Secure connection 
This behavioural measure was designed to reflect the real world costs of stringent 
cybersecurity behaviour. It sought to evoke the compliance budget that users resort to 
when making a decision (Beautement, Sasse & Wonham, 2009). Participants had to 
choose between decreasing the risk of suffering a cyberattack, by spending extra time 
when connecting to a simulated intranet, or selecting an immediate connection, which 
increased their risk of a cyberattack.   
A connection to the simulated intranet was necessary before entering the eCommerce 
website. Participants could choose between two options: a secure vs. an unsecured 
connection. The variable “secure connection” was binary. It scored 0 if subjects chose to 
behave unsafely and selected the unsecured option; and 1 if they made the secure 
choice. The options appeared randomly on the left or right-hand side of the screen to 
avoid location having an effect on participants' decisions.  
The unsecured connection meant an instant connection to a simulated intranet. 
Participants did not have to wait for the connection, and it did not require a password 
(see Figure 3).  
For the secure connection, participants had to wait 60 seconds and they had to type in a 
complicated access code provided on the screen, which included a random combination 
of 12 upper- and lower-case letters and numbers (i.e. it required an additional cognitive 
effort, see Figure 4). Participants were made aware that it would take 60 seconds to 
connect, but that the connection was secure.  
The next screen displayed a processing bar during the connection. Below the bar, 
participants could see a button that allowed them to switch to the unsecured but 
immediate connection if they did not want to wait the entire 60 seconds. By including 
this possibility, participants could change their minds as they do in the real world.  
Figure 3: Intranet connection screen with two options 
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Figure 4: Requirement to enter access code  
 
3.2.2 Trusted vendor  
This behavioural measure sought to reflect how, in the real world, access to free 
products often implies a security risk, which is effectively eliminated when a product is 
purchased through a trusted vendor.  
Once subjects connected to the intranet, they were able to see the eCommerce website. 
The home page contained the company name and logo. In the bottom left-hand corner, 
there was a link to the terms and conditions. The link contained information about how 
the data would be managed, used and stored; the rights of the user, and copyright 
information. All this information followed the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. 
Participants had to accept the terms and conditions during the sign-up process by 
clicking the button “I agree to the Terms and Conditions”. The home page was the entry 
point for subjects to choose the products (see Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Home page  
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When a subject clicked on a product, a detailed page for that product opened. On this 
page, the subject had to choose between two vendors (their order altered randomly; 
Figure 6). One vendor offered the product for free. In this case, the link to download the 
product had no security signs (i.e. no image for an e-trusted site appeared). The 
simulated link for this supplier was http (Hypertext Transfer Protocol). The other vendor 
offered the product for €2, but the link to download it was https (Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol Secure) and appeared next to an image indicating it was an e-trusted site. The 
measure scored zero if participants chose the unsecured option and one if they chose the 
secure option (i.e. the trusted vendor). 
Figure 6: Choice of vendor page 
 
3.2.3 Password strength 
After selecting one of the vendors, participants had to register by creating a username 
and password. On the same screen, they were also asked to introduce a credit card 
number, CVV and expiry date. A simulated credit card was provided to participants on 
the screen (see Figure 7).  
The behavioural measure 'password strength' established the strength of the chosen 
password. It was measured according to six common security parameters and scored 
between zero (if subjects did not meet any of the parameters) and six (if they met them 
all). These parameters were the following: 
- Minimum number of characters: 8 
- Minimum number of lower case characters: 2 
- Minimum number of upper case characters: 2 
- Minimum number of numeric digit characters: 2 
- Minimum number of special characters: 2 
- Boolean check whether password contains the username 
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Figure 7: Page requesting password 
 
3.2.4 Log-out  
This behavioural measure sought to document whether users were attentive and logged 
out of their eCommerce session, or whether they continued to navigate without logging 
out. Once subjects had completed the purchasing process, a screen displayed 
information about the cost of the product purchased and how much they had left on their 
credit cards. A new button appeared at the bottom right-hand side of this screen which 
led participants to the 'next questionnaire'. However, they had the option to log-out 
before doing so, by clicking on a button in the top right-hand corner (see Figure 8). 
Participants were not directly guided to log-out. They were simply asked to exit the 
eCommerce site and complete the second questionnaire. The behavioural measure 'log-
out' scored zero if they just clicked on the 'next questionnaire' button and one if they 
chose the safe option and logged-out first.  
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Figure 8: Log-out page 
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4 Results 
The final sample of 5,065 was segmented according to gender and age (see Table 1 for a 
breakdown). With regard to the education of participants, most participants had either 
finished high school or had a university degree (see Table 2 for a breakdown).  
Table 1: Sample socio-demographics by country 
Gender  
Age 
<35's 35+'s Total 
n % n % n % of total 
Spain 
Men 198 38.18 320 61.82 518 51.59 
Women 208 42.84 278 57.16 486 48.41 
Total  406 40.44 598 59.56 1004 100 
UK 
Men 149 30.98 332 69.02 481 47.67 
Women 231 43.75 297 56.25 528 52.33 
Total 380 37.66 629 62.34 1009 100 
Germany 
Men 184 35.87 329 64.13 513 50.59 
Women 182 36.33 319 63.67 501 49.41 
Total 366 36.09 648 63.91 1014 100 
Sweden 
Men 156 30.65 353 69.35 509 49.95 
Women 208 40.78 302 59.22 510 50.05 
Total 364 35.72 655 64.28 1019 100 
Poland 
Men 245 49.10 254 50.90 499 48.97 
Women 271 52.12 249 47.88 520 51.03 
Total 516 50.64 503 49.36 1019 100 
Total sample 
Men 932 36.98 1588 63.08 2520 49.75 
Women 1100 43.22 1445 56.78 2545 50.25 
Total 2032 40.12 3033 59.88 5065 100 
 
Table 2: Education of participants in the total sample 
Education level n % 
   
No studies 17 0.34 
Primary or secondary education 674 13.31 
High school or technical education 2,094 41.34 
University graduate 1,686 33.29 
Postgraduate 483 9.54 
PhD 87 1.72 
No answer 24 0.47 
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A total of 26,991 participants clicked on the email that gave access to the experiment, 
but only 17,700 accessed the experiment. Out of these, 5,322 completed the 
experiment. However, 257 of these were classified as 'speeders', i.e. they completed one 
of the questionnaires or the full experiment in less than one third of the median time 
allocated by participants in a given country. See Table 3 for a breakdown of data by 
country. 
Table 3: Breakdown of participants by country 
 Spain UK Germany Sweden Poland Total 
Total subjects click the 
email 
4180 5577 6041 6003 5190 26991 
Total subjects access 
the experiment 
2799 3629 3736 3867 3669 17700 
Total subjects complete 
the experiment 
1064 1062 1061 1052 1083 5322 
Total 'speeders' 60 53 47 33 64 257 
Total subjects 1004 1009 1014 1019 1019 5065 
 
The number of dropouts (i.e. those who accessed the experiment but decided to not to 
complete it) merits close attention, as it might have a bearing on the results presented 
in this section. In particular, the warning messages about cybersecurity threats 
(particularly the threat appraisal condition, which made reference to a virus) might have 
had an effect on the decision to dropout out of the experiment. Indeed, most dropouts 
occurred at the stage of the purchasing process where this message appeared. 
When we look at the number of dropouts that occurred only after exposure to the nudge, 
it emerges that the threat appraisal condition witnessed the largest number of dropouts 
(66.2%), followed by the low-risk, high-impact condition (65.1%) and the combined 
coping + threat appraisal condition (63.8%). The control condition showed a dropout 
rate of 62.1%. The low-risk, high impact condition is not comparable to the control 
condition. But when we compare the threat appraisal condition to the control, the 
difference is statistically significant (t = 2.29, p<0.05). Not so the coping + threat 
condition. It appears that the threat of a virus getting onto the participant's computer 
might have been too strong, and may have led to an increased number of dropouts. 
Also of note are the gain-framed and loss-framed conditions, which had noticeably lower 
dropout rates than the control condition (57.7% and 58.0% respectively, vs 62.1%). 
These differences were statistically significant (t = 2.36, p<0.05 and t = 2.13, p<0.05, 
respectively). It appears that the reminder to participants that they stood to gain a 
reward for navigating safely (however this was framed) was enough of a nudge to make 
them keep participating in the experiment. This analysis suggests that the dropout rate, 
its implications for the composition of the sample and its possible inclusion as an output 
measure, merits further attention.  
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Figure 9: Total number of dropouts after exposure to the warning message, per 
experimental condition 
 
4.1 Effect of experimental conditions 
Next we present the results of the impact of the experimental conditions on the 
behavioural measures. For each set of behavioural insights, we provide information on 
the distribution of the decisions made by the participants in this experiment over the 
four behavioural measures under consideration, plus a composite indicator.  
Two-tailed t-tests were conducted to test the hypotheses. They compared the means of 
groups under observation (i.e. control condition vs. treatment, or treatment vs. 
treatment). Information regarding the subsamples – i.e. mean, standard deviation, and 
minimum and maximum score – is also provided. 
4.1.1 PMT-inspired conditions 
Results from the PMT-inspired conditions show that the heightened coping appraisal 
condition had an effect on all four behavioural measures. In all of them, participants 
exposed to a message that said they could easily minimise the possibility of suffering a 
cyberattack by choosing connections, remembering to log out and using secure 
passwords, exhibited more secure behaviour than participants in the control condition. 
Hypothesis 1 is supported in all four behavioural measures.  
The heightened threat appraisal condition, on the other hand, was less effective. 
Warning users that failing to navigate safely could lead to their personal data being 
compromised or a virus getting onto their computer only had an effect on the 'trusted 
vendor' measure. Hypothesis 2 is only supported in one behavioural measure, but not in 
the remaining three. However, we must always consider the possibility that the 
increased dropout rate for heightened threat appraisal resulted in a sample that was 
slightly different to the other samples. It could be that those who did not drop out were 
0
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less likely to navigate safely (since those who were prone to navigating safely might 
have been scared at the first sight of the nudge and dropped out). It is possible that the 
effects of the threat appraisal condition are understated. 
With regard to the combination of both PMT elements (coping and threat appraisal) into 
one condition, results show that it was effective in generating more secure behaviour in 
three behavioural measures: 'trusted vendor', 'password strength' and 'log-out'. 
Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported in these measures (but not in 'secure connection'). 
There were no statistically significant differences in the means of all four behavioural 
measures between combined coping + threat appraisal and heightened coping appraisal. 
Hypothesis 4 is rejected. The analysis showed differences between heightened threat 
appraisal and combined coping + threat appraisal, but only for two of the four 
behavioural measures: 'password strength' and 'log-out'. Hypothesis 5 is supported, but 
only in these two measures. 
Table 4: Results of hypotheses testing on PMT treatments for each behavioural measure 
Conditions n Mean SD Min - 
Max 
t-test# 
Treatment 
 vs.  
control 
t-test# 
Treatment 
 vs.  
treatment 
Secure connection: 
Control 507 0.83 0.38 0 – 1  NA NA 
Coping 505 0.87 0.33 0 - 1 0.0452**           - 
Threat  504 0.87 0.34 0 - 1 0.0873           - 
Coping + threat  508 0.86 0.35 0 - 1 0.2231           - 
Coping vs. coping+threat - - - - - 0.4303 
Threat vs. coping+threat - - - - - 0.6204 
Trusted vendor: 
Control 507 0.52 0.50 0 – 1  NA NA 
Cope  505  0.63 0.48 0 – 1  0.0006***           - 
Threat  504 0.67 0.47 0 – 1  0.0000***           - 
Coping + threat  508 0.68 0.47 0 – 1  0.0000***           - 
Coping vs. coping+threat - - - - - 0.0861           
Threat vs. coping+threat - - - - - 0.7224           
Password strength: 
Control 507 3.03 1.06 0 – 6  NA NA 
Coping 505 3.44 1.11 0 – 6  0.0000***           - 
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Threat  504 3.08 1.10 1 – 6  0.4463           - 
Coping + threat  508 3.51 1.06 1 – 6  0.0000***           - 
Coping vs. coping+threat - - - - -  0.3305           
Threat vs. coping+threat - - - - - 0.0000***           
Log-out: 
Control 507 0.18 0.38 0 – 1  NA NA 
Coping 505 0.36 0.48 0 – 1  0.0000***           - 
Threat  504 0.18 0.39 0 – 1  0.8998           - 
Coping + threat  508 0.32 0.47 0 – 1  0.0000***           - 
Coping vs. coping+threat - - - - - 0.1857            
Threat vs. coping+threat - - - - - 0.0000***           
# p-value  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
Figure 10: Mean scores for the three binary behavioural measures, by PMT condition  
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4.1.2 Gain vs loss-framed conditions 
A gain-framed message was more effective than the control condition in generating 
secure behaviour, but only for the 'trusted vendor' behavioural measure. Hypothesis 6 is 
supported only in this measure; in the three remaining measures, there was no 
statistically significant difference. 
The loss-framed message had the same result: it was more effective than the control 
condition, but only for the 'trusted vendor' condition. Hypothesis 7 is supported when 
using this behavioural measure, but not the remaining three, where there was no 
statistically significant difference. Finally, there was no difference between loss and gain-
framed conditions for any of the behavioural messages. Hypothesis 8 is not supported. 
Table 5: Results of hypotheses testing on gain vs loss-framed treatments for each 
behavioural measure 
Conditions n Mean SD Min - 
Max 
t-test# 
Treatment 
 vs.  
Control 
t-test# 
Treatment 
 vs.  
Treatment 
Secure connection: 
Control 507 0.83 0.38 0 – 1  NA NA 
Gain-framed  507 0.85 0.36 0 – 1  0.4443 - 
Loss-framed  509 0.84 0.36 0 - 1 0.5355           - 
Gain vs loss-framed - - - - - 0.8839 
Trusted vendor: 
Control 507 0.52 0.50 0 – 1  NA NA 
Gain-framed  507 0.65 0.48 0 – 1  0.0000***           - 
Loss-framed  509 0.59 0.49 0 – 1  0.0235**           - 
Gain vs loss-framed - - - - - 0.0591           
Password strength: 
Control 507 3.03 1.06 0 – 6  NA NA 
Gain-framed  507 3.10 1.04 0 – 6  0.2942           - 
Loss-framed  509 3.04 1.05 1 – 6  0.8363           - 
Gain vs loss-framed - - - - - 0.3978            
Log-out: 
Control 507 0.18 0.38 0 – 1  NA NA 
Gain-framed  507 0.19 0.40 0 –1  0.5185           - 
Loss-framed  509 0.19 0.40 0 – 1  0.4872           - 
Gain vs loss-framed - - - - - 0.9613            
# p-value 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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Figure 11: Mean scores for the three binary behavioural measures, by gain or loss-
framed condition  
 
4.1.3 Female and male anthropomorphic characters 
A female anthropomorphic character had no effect on secure behaviour compared to the 
control condition, for any of the four behavioural measures. Hypothesis 9 is not 
supported. Regarding the male anthropomorphic character, the only significant result 
involved the 'trusted vendor' behavioural measure: a message with a male 
anthropomorphic character was more effective than the control in making people choose 
the trusted vendor.  Hypothesis 10 is supported for this behavioural measure, but not for 
the remaining three. Further analysis shows that a male anthropomorphic character is 
also more effective than the female anthropomorphic character for this measure. 
Table 6: Results of hypotheses testing on female and male anthropomorphic character 
treatments for each behavioural measure 
Conditions n Mean SD Min - 
Max 
t-test# 
Treatment 
 vs  
control 
t-test# 
Treatment 
 vs  
treatment 
Secure connection: 
Control 507 0.83 0.38 0 – 1  NA - 
Female  503 0.86 0.34 0 - 1 0.1304           - 
Male  505 0.86 0.34 0 - 1 0.1238           - 
Female vs male - - - - - 0.9800           
Trusted vendor: 
Control 507 0.52 0.50 0 – 1  NA - 
Female  503 0.54  0.50 0 – 1  0.4452           - 
Male  505 0.61 0.49 0 – 1  0.0034***           - 
Female vs male - - - - - 0.0310**           
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Password strength: 
Control 507 3.03 1.06 0 – 6  NA - 
Female  503 2.99 1.11 0 – 6 0.6012           - 
Male  505 3.04 1.06 1 – 6  0.9040           - 
Female vs male - - - - - 0.5232           
Log-out: 
Control 507 0.18 0.38 0 – 1  NA - 
Female  503 0.20 0.40 0 – 1  0.3871           - 
Male  505 0.19 0.39 0 – 1  0.6057           - 
Female vs male - - - - - 0.7272           
# p-value  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
Figure 12: Mean scores for the three binary behavioural measures, by female or male 
anthropomorphic condition  
 
 
4.1.4 Low-risk, high-impact vs high-risk, low-impact 
No difference was found between low-risk, high impact conditions and high-risk, low-
impact conditions in any of the four behavioural measures. Hypothesis 11 was not 
supported. 
  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
secure connection trusted vendor log-out
Control
Female
anthropomorphic
Male
anthropomorphic
 25 
 
Table 7: Results of hypotheses testing on low-risk, high-impact and high-risk, low-
impact treatments for each behavioural measure  
Conditions n Mean SD Min - Max t-test# 
Treatment 
 vs.  
treatment 
Secure connection: 
Low-risk, high-impact 511 0.92 0.27 0 - 1 - 
High-risk, low-impact 506 0.92 0.28 0 - 1 - 
Low-risk, high-impact vs 
high-risk, low-impact 
- - - - 0.9912           
Trusted vendor: 
Low-risk, high-impact 511 0.78 0.41 0 – 1 - 
High-risk, low-impact 506 0.73 0.44 0 – 1  - 
Low-risk, high-impact vs 
high-risk, low-impact 
- - - - 0.0559            
Password strength: 
Low-risk, high-impact 511 3.20 1.09 0 – 6  - 
High-risk, low-impact 506 3.25 1.09  0 – 6  - 
Low-risk, high-impact vs 
high-risk, low-impact 
- - - - 0.4694           
Log-out: 
Low-risk, high-impact 511 0.21 0.41 0 – 1  - 
High-risk, low-impact 506 0.26 0.44 0 – 1  - 
Low-risk, high-impact vs 
high-risk, low-impact 
- - - - 0.0617           
# p-value  
 
The graphs presented above exclude the behavioural measure 'password strength'. The 
reason for this is that all the other behavioural measures are binary, whereas password 
strength is measured on a scale from 1 to 6. Figure 13 presents results of participants' 
score for password strength according to experimental treatment. As discussed earlier, 
only in coping appraisal message and coping + threat appraisal message was there a 
difference with the control group. Quite simply, participants needed to be told what a 
secure password looked like. The same can easily apply in other realms of cybersecurity 
behaviour: people cannot be expected to know as much about security behaviour as 
those who design IT systems. 
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Figure 13: Mean scores for 'password strength', by female or male anthropomorphic 
condition  
 
4.1.5 The cybersecurity index: a different perspective 
While all of the behavioural measures capture one aspect of secure online behaviour, 
there is no single measure that summarises how securely a participant behaved 
throughout the experiment. To overcome this, we proposed a composite behavioural 
measure. In this 'cybersecurity index', all measures were equally weighted, as there was 
no evidence a priori that any of them should be reinforced. The following formula was 
applied: 
𝐶𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  
𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
6 + 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑢𝑡
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There are limitations to this index. For one, the assumption that all four behavioural 
measures should carry the same weight can be challenged. Therefore, we do not 
propose relying on it in isolation; rather, it should be understood in the context of the 
study and together with the individual behavioural measures. On the plus side, the index 
does provide a starting point and invites divergent viewpoints on the matter.  
A similar indicator was developed by the authors for a lab experiment in a previous 
study (Rodriguez-Priego & van Bavel, 2016). However, it cannot be compared to this 
one, for two reasons. Firstly, it includes one more behavioural measure (secure 
connection) that was not used as indicator in the lab experiment because of a ceiling 
effect. Secondly, password strength is measured on a scale from 1 to 6 in this 
experiment, while in the lab experiment it is measured from 1 to 7. In the online 
experiment, participants did not have to provide an email, so security parameter number 
7 of the lab experiment, namely a Boolean search (to see whether the password 
contained the participant's email), could not be checked. 
Results show that, for the PMT treatments, heightened coping appraisal, heightened 
threat appraisal and combined coping + threat appraisal all have a positive effect on 
participant's security behaviour when compared to the control group. Moreover, the 
combined coping + threat appraisal condition is more effective than the heightened 
threat appraisal condition. 
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For the gain and loss-framed treatments, gain-framed led to more secure behaviour than 
the control condition, but loss-framed did not. There was no difference between the 
effectiveness of gain-framed and loss-framed.  
For the female and male anthropomorphic characters, only the male character had an 
effect: it led to a higher score on the cybersecurity index than the control and the female 
character. The female character had no effect compared to the control condition. 
Finally, there was no difference in the scores of the cybersecurity index between the low-
risk, high-impact condition and the high-risk, low-impact condition. 
Table 8: Results of all experimental conditions on the cybersecurity index 
Conditions n Mean SD Min - 
Max 
t-test# 
Treatment 
 vs.  
Control 
t-test# 
Treatment 
 vs.  
Treatment 
Control 507 0.51 0.22 0.04 – 1  NA NA 
PMT-inspired conditions 
Coping  505 0.61 0.25 0.04 – 1  0.0000***           - 
Threat  504 0.56 0.20 0.04 – 1  0.0002***           - 
Coping + threat  508 0.61 0.24 0.04 – 1 0.0000***           - 
Coping vs coping + threat - - - - - 0.9228           
Threat vs coping + threat - - - - - 0.0001***       
Gain vs loss-framed  conditions 
Gain-framed  507 0.55 0.21 0.04 – 1  0.0014***           - 
Loss-framed  509 0.53 0.23 0.04 – 1  0.0606           - 
Gain vs loss-framed - - - - - 0.2126           
Female and male anthropomorphic characters 
 
Female anthropomorphic 503 0.53 0.22 0 – 1  0.1774           - 
Male anthropomorphic 505 0.54 0.22 0.04 – 1  0.0104***           - 
Female vs male 
anthropomorphic 
- - - - - 0.2266           
Low-risk, high-impact vs high-risk, low-impact 
 
Low-risk, high-impact 511 0.61 0.20 0.04 – 1  N/A - 
High-risk, low-impact 506 0.61 0.21 0.08 – 1  N/A - 
Low-risk, high-impact vs 
high-risk, low-impact 
- - - - - 0.9912           
# p-value, *** p<0.01  
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Figure 14: Mean scores of cybersecurity index by experimental condition 
 
Note: Low-risk, high-impact and high-risk, low-impact conditions are not comparable with the 
control condition 
4.2 Socio-demographic analysis 
We conducted demographic analyses to see the effect of country, gender and age on the 
four behavioural measures and the composite cybersecurity index. 
There was no difference by countries on the ‘secure connection' measure. The 'trusted 
vendor' measure, however, varied considerably: there was a statistical difference 
between all countries, except between Germany and Spain (see Figure 15). For 
'password strength', there was a difference only between Spain and Sweden (3.05 on 
average vs 3.30, p<0.001), and between Poland and Sweden (3.15 vs 3.30, p<0.001). 
For 'log-out', only Germany and Spain had significantly different scores (0.27 vs 0.19, 
p<0.001). Finally, in the cybersecurity index, there was a statistically significant 
difference between all countries except the following pairings: DE-SE, DE-UK, SP-PL and 
SE-UK. The pattern of scores for this index resembles that of 'trusted vendor' (Figure 
16). 
Figure 15: Mean scores for the three binary behavioural measures, by country 
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Figure 16: Mean scores for 'cybersecurity index', by country 
 
With regard to gender, there was a difference in the mean scores for ‘secure connection'. 
Men were less likely to choose the secure connection, scoring 0.85 on average vs. 0.89 
by women (p<0.001). For 'trusted vendor' there was no difference. For 'log-out' and 
'password strength', however, the situation was inverted: men did better than women 
(log-out: 0.25 vs 0.21, p<0.001; password strength: 3.20. vs 3.14, p<0.05). In the 
cybersecurity index, these effects cancelled each other out: no statistical difference was 
found between men and women. 
Figure 17: Mean scores for the three binary behavioural measures, by gender 
 
With regard to age, there were differences between participants aged under 35 (<35's) 
and those aged 35 and over (35+'s) in two behavioural measures. In both cases, older 
participants were more cautious. In ‘secure connection', <35's scored 0.85 on average 
vs 0.88 by 35+'s (p<0.001). In 'log-out', <35's scored 0.19 on average vs 0.26 by 
35+'s (p<0.001). This difference carried over to the combined 'cybersecurity index', 
where <35's scored 0.55 on average vs 0.58 by 35+'s. 
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Figure 18: Percentage of participants who made the 'secure choice' in three binary 
behavioural measures, by age 
 
4.3 Analysis of questionnaire items 
In addition to making a purchase in the mock eCommerce store, participants answered 
questions on their socio-demographic characteristics, risk aversion, trust online, and 
knowledge of cybersecurity.  
4.3.1 Risk aversion 
The risk aversion construct was based on 30 items of the Dospert scale (Blais & Weber, 
2006; Weber, Blais & Betz, 2002), and was shown to the participant before the 
purchasing process began. The items of the construct presented high reliability 
(Cronbach's alpha: 0.87). Lower values in risk aversion meant that the participant was 
more risk averse. The purpose of including these items was to find out whether risk 
aversion was a determining factor in secure online behaviour. Results show that it was. 
Risk aversion had a positive and significant effect on: choosing a secure connection, 
buying from a trusted vendor, and logging-out (see ANOVA and probit results in 
Table 9). The more risk averse the participant, the more likely they would be to exhibit 
secure behaviour according to these measures. There are no results for the measure 
'password strength' (although the ANOVA provides a p-value under 0.05, the ordered 
probit regression shows there is no effect). 
Table 9: Results from ANOVA and ordered probit regression for the risk aversion 
construct 
 ANOVA Probit 
Secure connection 7.4433756 
(0.000)           
-.230062 
(0.000) 
Trusted vendor 5.510104     
(0.000)       
-.0967589 
(0.001) 
Password strength 12.297246 
0.034           
-.0077582 
0.751 
Log-out  2.8910641           
0.003 
-.1005444 
(0.002) 
Note: Partial SS values reported for ANOVA (p-value in parenthesis); coefficient values for 
the ordered probit (p-values in parenthesis). 
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4.3.2 Trust online 
The trust online construct was composed of 6 questions (McKnight, Choudhury & 
Kacmar, 2002), which were asked directly after the purchasing process was completed.   
The construct displayed high reliability: with a Cronbach's alpha score of 0.89 and 
average inter-item covariance of 0.568. The items are presented in the Annex.  
The only behavioural measure which correlated with trust online was ‘secure connection' 
(partial SS: 1.312, p-value: 0.022). However, a further probit regression does not 
confirm this effect (p = 0.546). For all other behavioural measures, there was no 
significant effect. 
4.3.3 Knowledge  
A number of items included in the post-purchase questionnaire were related to 
knowledge (see Annex for a full list).  We were interested in whether the experimental 
conditions had an impact on knowledge in parallel to their effect on behaviour. If they 
did not affect knowledge, it would be an indicator that the nudge worked by affecting 
System 1, side-stepping System 2 (Kahneman, 2011). If, on the other hand, knowledge 
was affected, we could reasonably assume that the nudge worked by fortifying 
participants' deliberative capacity. 
Results show that one knowledge variable was affected by experimental conditions: 
knowledge_logout. This variable tested whether participant knew that logging out could 
help them prevent a cyberattack. Coping threat appraisal and combined coping + threat 
appraisal had a significant effect on this variable (see Table 10). This was probably due 
to the warning messages in these conditions, both of which made explicit reference to 
logging out. On the other hand, they also made reference to choosing secure 
connections and using secure passwords, which were behavioural measures that showed 
no effect.  
Table 10: Ordered probit regression to test the effect of the treatments on 
Knowledge_logout 
Treatments  Coef. Std.Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Gain-framed .0005365    .0702144      0.01    0.994     -.1370812     .1381543 
Loss-framed .0643528    .0705355      0.91    0.362     -.0738942     .2025998 
Female 
anthropomorphic 
.0417738    .0707261      0.59    0.555     -.0968468     .1803945 
Male anthropomorphic .045672    .0705185      0.65    0.517     -.0925417     .1838857 
Coping appraisal .1756793    .0713878      2.46    0.014      .0357618     .3155969 
Threat appraisal .0457393    .0706855      0.65    0.518     -.0928018     .1842803 
Coping + threat 
appraisal 
.2281604    .0716854      3.18    0.001      .0876597     .3686612 
Note: Control group is the baseline (low-risk, high-impact and high-risk, low-impact conditions not 
included as they are not comparable to the control group). Number of observations =  4,048; LR 
chi2(7)= 18.43; prob > chi2 = 0.0102; log likelihood =  -4806.4388; pseudo R2 = 0.0019. 
  
 32 
 
5 Discussion 
The fact that the heightened coping appraisal condition was the most effective (it had an 
impact on all four behavioural measures) is one of the main results of the study. It 
suggests that the reason users often fail to behave securely is not necessarily because 
they do not care, or because they are unaware of the risks, but rather because they 
simply do not know what secure behaviour entails. Giving them specific instructions, and 
reminding them that it is easy and within their grasp, is therefore an effective way of 
generating secure behaviour. This clearly has implications for policies that seek to make 
online transactions more secure. 
The heightened threat appraisal condition was relatively less effective. But a note of 
caution is needed here. The threat of introducing a virus onto participants' computers 
may simply have been too realistic. The warnings in the other experimental conditions 
were limited to damage within the confines of the experiment, i.e. the risk that 
participants could lose their fee. This may have contributed to an excessive drop-out 
rate in this condition. Perhaps, those participants who were most susceptible to the 
message dropped out, leaving the more resilient ones to complete the experiment. This 
potentially biased sample might have understated the strength of the warning message.  
The combined coping + threat appraisal was also effective, but in fewer behavioural 
measures than heightened coping appraisal (three out four). Hypothesis 4 suggested 
that, due to the added effect of the heightened threat appraisal message, the combined 
coping + threat appraisal should be more effective than the heightened coping appraisal. 
However, there is no evidence of a statistically significant difference in the means of the 
three behavioural measures affected by these conditions.  
Hypothesis 5 applied the same logic to heightened threat appraisal and combined coping 
+ threat appraisal. Results show that the latter is more effective than the former, thanks 
to the addition of the heightened coping appraisal message. While the heightened threat 
appraisal condition had no impact on any behavioural measure, the combined coping + 
threat appraisal condition had an impact on three. In sum, heightened coping appraisal 
was effective in generating secure behaviour as a nudge on its own. Moreover, adding it 
to heightened threat appraisal made this latter condition effective, whereas, on its own, 
it was not. 
One question remains. Why, if heightened coping appraisal had an impact on all four 
behavioural measures, did combined coping + threat appraisal fail to have an effect on 
'secure connection'? In no measure did heightened threat appraisal have a negative 
effect on secure behaviour (not even a statistically non-significant one). So why would 
its combination with heightened coping threat appraisal erode the latter's effectiveness? 
The most plausible explanation would seem to be that it simply made the message too 
long, which discouraged participants from reading it fully. 
Regarding gain and loss-framed conditions, results show that they both had a positive 
effect on the 'trusted vendor' behavioural measure. They also differed significantly from 
the control condition in the dropout rate (participants in these conditions were less likely 
to drop out after seeing the warning message than in the control). But there was no 
evidence of any difference between a loss-framed message and a gain-framed one. This 
result implies that reinforcing a warning message with information on what can be 
gained or lost will contribute to changing behaviour: it will act as an incentive to stay 
logged on, and will also lead people to be more cautious when selecting a vendor. 
Of the male and female anthropomorphic characters, only the male anthropomorphic 
character had an effect, and only on one measure ('trusted vendor'). Further research 
needs to be undertaken to better understand the role of these characters on online 
behaviour. Finally, the comparison of a message that gave a high probability of losing a 
small amount with one that gave a low probability of losing a large amount yielded no 
results.  
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In sum, the experimental conditions based on insights from protection motivation theory 
(PMT) were the most effective. PMT therefore holds promise as a theoretical 
underpinning for policies which seek to make people behave more securely. 
Of the behavioural measures, one appears to have been more sensitive to the 
experimental conditions: 'trusted vendor'. It was affected by all PMT-inspired conditions, 
the gain and loss-framed message conditions and the male anthropomorphic character 
condition. The reasons behind this are not immediately clear and cannot be explained 
convincingly by the empirical data provided here. However, they might have a cultural 
element to them. 'Trusted vendor' was the measure that showed the greatest variation 
across countries (there were differences between all countries, except Germany and 
Spain). It could be that, when faced with the option of paying for something vs getting 
something for free, the risk of unsecured behaviour becomes more apparent. In other 
words, exposure to cybersecurity threats may be perceived as the price for getting 
something for free. 
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6 Conclusion 
This study applies experimental methodology to the study of cybersecurity behaviour. It 
forms part of a wider trend which applies behavioural insights to policy-making (van 
Bavel, Herrmann, Esposito & Proestakis, 2013; Lunn, 2014; World Bank, 2015; Obama, 
2015; Lourenço, Ciriolo, Almeida & Troussard, 2016). This research has effectively 
explored the role of changes to the choice architecture on online decision-making, or 
nudging (Sunstein, 2013; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  
It has shown that warning messages built on established behavioural insights in the 
specific literature, such as those inspired by PMT or gain vs loss-framing, can be 
effective. It has also shown that some behavioural measures (such as 'trusted vendor') 
are more susceptible to experimental conditions, and therefore more malleable. Risk 
aversion has been shown to correlate with security behaviour, and that the nudges have 
only a limited effect on knowledge of cybersecurity. Finally, security behaviour will vary 
from country-to-country significantly, and show some differences according to age (older 
participants being more cautious). Regarding gender, results are inconclusive. 
Perhaps one of the main contributions of this study is its emphasis on observed, actual 
behaviour. Much of the evidence on online behaviour is limited to intention or to self-
reported behaviour. In both these cases, the gap with actual behaviour can be 
significant. Using experimental methodology to test behavioural insights on actual 
behaviour is promising and could be an effective tool for testing proposed policy 
interventions. It may not provide all the answers, but it is a robust method for building a 
body of reliable data on which to base policy. 
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Annex: Questionnaire items 
Table 11: Risk aversion 
Construct Question Answer 
Risk 
aversion 
 
For each of the following statements, please 
indicate the likelihood that you would engage 
in the described activity or behaviour if you 
were to find yourself in that situation. Provide 
a rating from Extremely Unlikely to Extremely 
Likely, using the following scale:  
1. Admitting that your tastes are different 
from those of a friend. 
2. Going camping in the wilderness. 
3. Betting a day's income at a casino. 
4. Investing 10% of your annual income in a 
moderate growth mutual fund. 
5. Drinking heavily at a social function. 
6. Taking some questionable deductions on 
your income tax return. 
7. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a 
major issue. 
8. Betting a day's income at a high-stake 
poker game. 
9. Having an affair with a married 
man/woman. 
10.Passing off somebody else’s work as your 
own. 
11.Going down a ski run that is beyond your 
ability. 
12.Investing 5% of your annual income in a 
very speculative stock. 
13.Going white-water rafting at high water in 
the spring. 
14.Betting a day's income on the outcome of 
a sporting event. 
15.Engaging in unprotected sex. 
16.Revealing a friend’s secret to someone 
else. 
17.Driving a car wearing a seat belt (reversed 
item). 
18.Investing 10% of your annual income in a 
new business venture. 
19.Taking a skydiving class. 
20.Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. 
21.Choosing a career that you truly enjoy 
over a more secure one. 
22.Speaking your mind about an unpopular 
issue in a meeting at work. 
23.Sunbathing without sunscreen. 
24.Bungee jumping off a tall bridge. 
25.Piloting a small plane. 
26.Walking home alone at night in an unsafe 
Scale from [1] 
Extremely Unlikely 
to [5] Extremely 
Likely. 
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area of town. 
27.Moving to a city far away from your 
extended family. 
28.Starting a new career in your mid-thirties. 
29.Leaving your young children alone at home 
while running an errand. 
30.Returning a wallet you found that contains 
€200 (reversed item). 
 
Table 12: Trust in the online environment 
Construct Question Answer 
Trust 
online 
 
Please, choose in the table below the level 
of agreement or disagreement with the 
statements listed:  
1. I am comfortable making purchases 
or other activities on the Internet 
2. I feel that most Internet vendors 
would act in a customers' best 
interest. 
3. I am comfortable relying on Internet 
vendors to meet their obligations. 
4. I feel fine doing business on the 
Internet since Internet vendors 
generally fulfil their agreements. 
5. In general, most Internet vendors are 
competent at serving their customers. 
6. I feel confident that encryption and 
other technological advances on the 
Internet make it safe for me to do 
business there. 
Scale from 
 [1] Strongly agree  
[5] Strongly 
disagree. 
 
 
Table 13: Perceived knowledge 
Construct Question Answer 
Perceived 
knowledge 
 
How well informed do you feel about 
the risks of cybercrime?  
1. Not at all 
informed. 
2. Not very well 
informed. 
3. Somewhat 
informed. 
4. Fairly well 
informed. 
5. Very well 
informed. 
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Table 14: Knowledge 
Construct Question Answer 
Knowledge 
 
Which of the following behaviours 
do you think can help you prevent 
from being attacked while online? 
Provide a rating from  
[1] It won't reduce 
my risk at all to 
[5] It will reduce my 
risk extremely 
 
Knowledge_safe 
 
Connecting to a trusted 
connection. 
Knowledge_pswd1 Using a strong password. 
Knowledge_pswd2 Changing your password 
frequently. 
Knowledge_pswd3 Avoid using the same password 
for different sites. 
Knowledge_signup Providing minimum information. 
Knowledge_trust Connecting to a trusted site. 
Knowledge_logout Logging out. 
Knowledge_soft1 Using anti-virus software and 
firewalls. 
Knowledge_soft2 Updating software to the latest 
version. 
Knowledge_public Avoiding access to my personal 
accounts in public places. 
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